In many organizations, intrusion detection and other related systems are tuned to generate security alerts, which are then manually inspected by cyber-security analysts. These analysts often devote a large portion of time to inspecting these alerts, most of which are innocuous. Thus, it would be greatly beneficial to reduce the number of innocuous alerts, allowing analysts to utilize their time and skills for other aspects of cyber defense. In this work, we devise several simple, fast, and easily understood models to cut back this manual inspection workload, while maintaining high true positive and true negative rates. We demonstrate their effectiveness on real data, and discuss their potential utility in application by others.
Introduction
Many organizations, especially those that handle sensitive information, have a cyber-security team that is responsible for monitoring and assessing threats on their network. These security analysts are highly skilled experts, trained specifically for this job. However, there are only a finite number of analysts who can perform this task adequately, and often their workload is vast. These individuals must, among other tasks, remain on the forefront of new known attacks, develop new methods for detecting yet-unseen threats, and attend to current potential threats. Due to this enormous volume, analysts may experience "alert desensitization" [1] ; due to the number of false positives encountered, analysts may miss true positive alerts, which lead to, e.g., compromised internal systems. In fact, alert desensitization has been used to describe the failure of Target to recognize an attack that led to the leak of millions of credit card numbers [2] . Thus, analysts would greatly benefit from a system that can filter (or triage) innocuous alerts and bring attention to those which may be real attacks.
Prior research has made headway into performing this alert triage task [3] . However, their methods require building machine learning models based on prior detected threats, which may take a long time to construct and use. Security threats rapidly evolve and change, which necessitates continuous updating of these models. This can be done, but often with a heavy cost of time and computing resources. In addition, due to the way these models are built, the task of classifying a previously unseen attack is difficult. Machine learning models are also notoriously difficult to infer from i.e., how or why does this model work, and can its predictions be trusted [4] ? Such questions are vitally important in cyber-security, as the ability to understand and trust a model's predictions can be the difference between a critical failure and a large reduction in mundane workload and increase in quality-of-life for your analyst team.
We present a number of simple, fast, and easily understood models to classify alerts and perform alert triage with high accuracy. These methods require no explicit prior knowledge of attacks on the system, and exploit attack time-and subject-locality. We test these models on real cyber-security data from our organization, and find:
1. The simplest model, which reduces the number of alerts an analyst must manually inspect by 50%, yields 97.18% true positive and 99.84% true negative rates. Minor augmentations can increase the true positive and true negative rates to 98.38% and 99.90%, respectively, reducing manual inspection workload by 48.40%.
2. More advanced (but still simple) models provide up to 99.15% true positive and 99.96% true negative rates, with a 99.32% workload reduction. Depending on how much one wishes to reduce manual inspection workload, true positive and true negative rates can be increased. We provide a few trade-off curves that allow management of true positive and true negative rates, balanced by manual inspection workload reduction, that can be tuned to an organization's specific needs.
3. Our methods work because our data contains alerts that are grouped by subject and time (i.e., locality), and the groups generally have homogeneous labels (i.e., alerts within a group are often labeled the same). We discuss the applicability of our work to other data that may be more heterogeneous within subject-and time-localities.
Data and Methodological Goals
Alert data analyzed by the security team is generated through multiple sensors, which may have different data formats. This raw data is then transformed into a unified format, and structured based on various meta-attributes to a human-digestible form. Here, our "structuring filters" are written by real analysts to group raw data by subject. Raw data is collected in time-batches; the period of the time-batch depends on the subject. Subjects can be thought of as a set of rules defined by the analyst team to detect and categorize particular threats. The approach for alert generation in our data is common in network monitoring. For example, one of our filters looks for all HTTP requests from a particular IP block, and runs twice a day 1 . If there are 5 instances of this event in the first run, and 3 instances in the second, we will generate two alert groups: the first comprising of 5 alerts (corresponding to instances), and the second comprising of 3 alerts. In this way, we have subject-and time-locality; each alert group contains only alerts of a given subject (in this example, HTTP requests from a particular IP block), which are grouped in time. These alert groups also contain metadata; this meta-data is not analyzed in this work.
After these alerts have been generated and grouped, analysts manually inspect each alert individually and mark them as "closed" (i.e., innocuous) or "promoted" (i.e., a potential threat that requires additional attention) 2 . Our goal is to build a classifier which accurately labels alerts as "closed" or "promoted" without requiring extensive manual inspection. Note that we assume all analysts label alerts correctly. This may not be true in practice, but is a necessary assumption as we use their labels as our ground truth.
In this work, we focus on exploiting only time-and subject-locality of alerts. As mentioned above, these alert groups do contain additional meta-data. The natural question then is: why not use meta-data as well?
A primary point of consideration in this work is to construct understandable models. We could very well extract every feature we can imagine and use those in addition to time and subject features. However, we believe this would severely hamper the ease of understanding our models, and potentially violate the principle of parsimony [5] , commonly observed in statistical modeling [6] 3 . It is critically important that we are able to understand and trust our models' predictions. Using a large number of features can easily make this task unwieldy. In addition, increasing the number of features also increases the time it takes to build a model. In essence, we have four main methodological goals for our classification models; they must:
1. Have a high true positive rate; secondarily, have a high true negative rate. Missing an alert that should have been promoted (i.e., false negatives) can be extremely costly, and should be avoided with priority.
2. Be fast to build, and fast to apply for prediction.
3. Be simple to understand, and thus easier to trust.
4. Save analysts' time and resources (i.e., reduce the number of alerts an analyst must manually inspect).
Results

Exploratory Analysis
In constructing any sort of classification model, exploratory analysis is an important initial step. In addition to other benefits, exploratory analysis allows us to understand our data more in-depth, discovering potential points of focus which may help improve model performance. We analyze 579, 408 closed alerts and 31, 349 promoted alerts, for a total of 610, 757 alerts. Thus, our data is very skewed; there are many more closed alerts than promoted alerts, as is expected with this type of data.
Initially, we set out to discover which attributes of alerts may be most predictive of their final classifications. Generally speaking, as threats evolve and change in time, we sought to discover whether or not there is clear timebased behavior in alert classifications. In addition, as skilled analysts are the ones who create the subject filters, we thought it best to examine alerts stratified by subject.
1 shows the number of promoted alerts for 16 subjects over a period of 3 consecutive months. We see that oftentimes alerts are not promoted. However, when alerts are promoted, they are commonly done so in large "bursts". For example, for Subject 3, there exists a very large burst of 23 promotions all at once. Recall that alerts are generated in groups at certain times, corresponding to alert groups. It turns out that this burst of promotions in Subject 3 is a single alert group that is all promoted 4 . We call this phenomenon one of time-and subject-locality; an alert group is built for a particular subject, at a particular point in time (corresponding to when the raw data was first encountered and processed). This discovery provides motivation. As promotions are relatively rare compared to closed alerts, if we can somehow leverage these large bursts in time, we will capture a large amount (in fact, majority) of the promoted alerts.
Constructing a Naive Baseline
When developing or applying a new method to existing data, it's important to establish a naive baseline to serve as a basis of comparison, or a goal to strive for. In our data, as mentioned above, we see clear evidence of burst behavior. Thus, an extremely naive approach would be to always use the previously observed label in time as a prediction for the next label, per subject. This method is very fast and simple; it can be done trivially in nearconstant time. The confusion matrix for our naive baseline model can be seen in 1. As shown, this naive model performs surprisingly well; we see a true negative rate (specificity) of 99.57% and a true positive rate (sensitiv- ity) of 94.27%. However, this method has one major flaw which violates one of our aforementioned goals: it does not reduce analysts' workload. For a past label to exist, an analyst must provide one. Thus, to implement this model in practice would still require an analyst to label every point, as every future point's prediction relies on the immediate prior label. If the prior label never changes (as would be the case here without an analyst to provide a label), we have no chance of predicting points correctly. The authors wish to emphasize that this naive model is impractical to implement in practice; it is presented merely as a motivation for the ideas behind the following, practical methods, as they build on top of this naive approach.
Alternating Analyst Labels
We see that our naive model performs well in terms of our measures of accuracy. However, it does not reduce analysts' workload, as an analyst is still required to label every prior point. A small augmentation can be made which results in a sizable workload reduction: have analysts manually label every-other point in time, for each subject. 2 depicts this process. Analysts manually label alerts in the analyst label state. These labels are then carried over for the next alert in subject-time (carried label state) as an automatic alert label (i.e., a prediction). It can be easily seen that this reduces the number of manually labeled points by 50%, as analysts only manually inspect Figure 2 : The process of alternating labeling. Low circles are closed labels; high circles are promoted labels. Solid circles indicate observed labels. Every other label is manually provided by an analyst and automatically carried over to the next alert in time for each subject.
every-other alert 5 . The results of this process applied on our data can be seen in 2. These results are initially surprising; one would think that this model should be less accurate than our naive baseline, as analysts perform less manual labeling. However, this phenomenon can be simply explained.
Recall that promotions often occur in bursts (1). In 2, this corresponds to a long "chain" of promoted points. In the fourth label state, we see that the first promotion in the chain is misclassified -it should be predicted as promoted, but is predicted closed. In the ninth label state, we see a one-off i.e., a promotion that does not occur as part of a chain. The naive model would never predict this point correctly, as the prior label (eighth label state) is closed, and the naive method would carry the closed label, resulting in an incorrect prediction; however, the alternating label method classifies this alert correctly. In fact, this situation is analogous to the fourth label state; the naive model would never predict this label correctly, as the prior label is closed. In addition, the naive model would never correctly predict the label in state seven, as its prior label is different. In summary, the naive model will never properly predict one-offs, the first label in a promotion chain, or the label immediately after the end of a promotion chain. The method presented in this section has a chance to properly predict both of these labels.
To see this, consider the following. Our method labels only 50% of the points manually, using predictions to fill in the rest. If we assume that promotion chains and the number of labels between consecutive chains are independent, we have a 50% probability of landing on the first label (or after-last label) in a promotion sequence during a manual label state. This leads to an expected value of 50% of these labels being correctly classified by this model 6 . Compare this to the naive model, which never guesses these two label types correctly. Thus, interestingly, by introducing a level of uncertainty (i.e., only manually labeling half of the alerts), we gain increased accuracy and reduced workload -two of our primary goals. In addition, this method is still very simple and thus easy to understand, and can also be implemented with trivial overhead.
A Small Augmentation
Though one-offs are a special case of the first promotion in a chain as described above, they are interesting in their own right. Why do these points exist, when chains are empirically more common? Recall that alerts are put into alert groups based on subject and time. Our data shows that one-offs in their own alert group (992) are more common than one-offs within a larger alert group (160) (i.e., alert groups with both promoted and closed alerts). If we enforce by process that all alert groups of size 1 be manually inspected, we increase our true positive and true negative rates with a small loss in workload reduction (50% to 48.40%). The results of this augmentation on our data can be found in 3. This small augmentation to the above process meets all our aforementioned goals, and is likely worthwhile as a small loss in workload reduction is negligible compared to the gain in true positive rate.
Alert Group Fractional Sampling
Recall that alerts are grouped into alert groups based on subject and the time at which the raw data was scanned. In the models presented so far, we consider time as continuous and ignore the structure imposed by alert groups themselves i.e., the fact that all alerts within an alert group are considered as occurring at the exact same time.
In the following models, we utilize this fact.
In all models that follow, we perform a sampling of a fraction of alerts within each alert group, manually labeling only the sample. Based on a particular fill strategy, we label the rest of the alerts in the alert group automatically, using the manually determined label as a guide.
The theory behind this method is based on a few observations. As noted briefly above (Section 3.1), most alert groups contain alerts which all have the same label, e.g., if one alert is promoted, it is likely all others are promoted. In other words, the conditional probability of some alert within an alert group being promoted, given another alert in the group is promoted, is very high. As we sample more alerts within an alert group, the sampling distribution of alert labels will approach the true distribution.
Fill Strategy: Random Within Sample
The simplest fill strategy is to take a random alert from our sampled fraction of alerts, and apply this label to all other currently unlabeled alerts within the group. For example, if an alert group has 10 alerts, and our fractional sample is set to 50%, we will manually label 5 of these alerts. We then randomly select one label from these 5 alerts and apply its label automatically to the remaining unlabeled alerts within the group. This second random selection step may seem superfluous, but is necessary to deal with heterogeneous groups i.e., alert groups that contain both promoted and closed alerts. If an alert group is heterogeneous, then randomly selecting one label from our initial fractional sample should capture this heterogeneity on average. The results of this strategy are shown in Figure 3a .
Fill Strategy: Any Promoted
Another simple fill strategy is to look at our manually labeled sample and see if any alerts are promoted. If so, we automatically say the rest of the alerts in the group should be promoted. This strategy heavily biases our predictions towards increasing true positives -one of our primary goals. In addition, this somewhat follows the cognitive bias that may exist when performing labeling. If one alert within a group is promoted, it is not far-fetched to believe that extra attention should be paid to the rest of the alerts in the group. This method, however, will inevitably increase false positives. The results of this strategy are shown in Figure 3b .
Fill Strategy: Heterogeneous Group Detection
The final fill strategy presented is one of heterogeneous group detection. As explained above, a heterogeneous alert group is one in which some alerts are promoted and some are closed. In this strategy, if we see heterogeneous labels in our manual labeling of the fractional sample, we manually label the rest of the alerts in the group. The theory behind this method is: if most groups are homogeneous, this strategy works just as well as random sampling in terms of workload reduction; we do not waste time manually labeling alerts that have the same label as others in the group. However, for groups that are heterogeneous, we gain the benefits of increased true positives similarly to the "any promoted" strategy, as we manually label the entire group. The results of this strategy are shown in Figure 3c . Figure 3 shows the results of the fractional sampling approach. The x-axis is the number of alerts that are automatically labeled (i.e., 1−fractional sample size). The first row of each plot shows specificity, mean sensitivity, and their average. Vertical bars are standard deviations over 1000 runs 7 . The second row depicts workload reduction. Note that the slope of this line for each plot is not exactly 1; there are many alert groups of size 1, and 7 As this method is probabilistic, we plot the average across all runs.
since we cannot sample a fraction of an alert, these alerts are always manually labeled regardless of fractional sample size. In addition, we take the ceiling of the fractional sample size, e.g., if the alert group is size 101 and our fractional sample size is 1%, we will manually label 2 alerts. The bottom row shows workload reduction per false positive, which is meant to illustrate a trade-off between increased false positives and decreased workload. A further description of this trade-off plot follows.
Our primary goal is to maximize true positive rate. When reducing the number of manually inspected alerts, this becomes difficult and generally comes at a cost of increased false positives. False positives increase overall effort required, as alerts that are marked as promoted (whether or not they truly should be) must be reviewed, discussed, and handled beyond the initial effort of performing the labeling. Thus, if we introduce too many false positives, we may completely nullify the workload reduction we gain in terms of manual inspection time. For example, in an extreme case, say we mark everything automatically as promoted. This yields a workload reduction in initial manual inspection (as is discussed here) of 100%; however, this is practically meaningless as all these alerts now incur an additional overhead in analyst time and resources spent, as they must be handled more in-depth than if they were manually labeled as closed.
The bottom row of each subplot in Figure 3 , then, can be interpreted as: for each false positive we introduce due to decreasing labeling workload, we incur some additional overhead. In the case of Figure 3c at an automatic labeling level of 99%, if this overhead time is ≥ 4354 times the amount of time it takes to initially label an alert on average, then the initial labeling workload reduction is completely nullified by the increase in overhead due to false positives.
Another trade-off analysis can be seen in 4. Here, we see workload reduction (x-axis) and sensitivity and specificity. The idea is that there comes some point at which we rapidly decrease sensitivity and specificity with a small decrease in workload (i.e., diminishing returns). Using these plots, we can determine this point for each fill strategy. For the any promoted (green) and heterogeneous group detection (red) strategies, we generally see sudden rapid loss with respect to sensitivity at 70% workload reduction. We see something similar for specificity for heterogeneous group detection, but a rapid gain for any promoted. Interestingly, we don't see this sudden rapid loss for the random within sample method; the loss is linear across workload reduction levels, but also consistently lower than the heterogeneous group detection method. 
Comparison to a "Standard" Machine Learning Approach
The classification methods outlined above can be thought of as primitive machine learning approaches. In fact, the authors' initial reasoning behind attempting these simple methods were guided by first implementing a classifier on the same data, plus meta-data, using standard machine learning methods. One such method is classification by random forests [7] . Using the Python package scikit-learn [8] , we built a random forest classifier with the number of trees determined by out-of-bag error rates [9] , evaluated using a method of time-series crossvalidation sometimes called forward chaining [10] with 4 folds. We use only 4 folds due to the rarity of promoted alerts; using more total folds causes some folds to contain no promoted alerts. The use of time-series crossvalidation, as opposed to a canonical cross-validation is crucially important for data with an explicit time com-ponent. To accurately evaluate the usefulness of such models, we must be careful to only train using data that occurs temporally before the test set. Forward chaining works as follows. If we are evaluating using 4 folds, we split the data into 5 time-ordered parts of equal size. We then train using all prior consecutive segments and test using the next fold on the horizon. The evaluation metric is then averaged across folds; here, we use AUC. Over many runs of the modeling process (i.e., many random forests built), this method yields and average AUC of 65.35%. In addition, this method never identifies any true positives; over all random forests built and evaluated, none correctly identified a promoted alert. This could be due to the rarity of such alerts. However, even when reducing the number of folds to 2, we obtain a similar average AUC across runs (65.53%). In addition, we tried bagged decision tree ensembles without the random subspace method [11] , which yielded similar results 8 .
It is interesting to note that the models built through machine learning had worse AUC (along with worse sensitivity and specificity), while having access to more features. In general, having more features does not necessarily lead to a better model. However, in the case of random forests, having more features increases the chance that an optimal subset of these features will be found that result in high predictive power (when using random subspaces). In addition, we also built random forests with only the features used for our developed approaches above in order to combat potential dilution of the feature space; such dilution could lead to poor performance 9 . These forests had similar performance to other random forests tried.
Conclusion
The models presented in this work (barring the naive model, provided as a baseline and motivator) all meet our mentioned goals; they have high true positive and true negative rates; they are fast to build and fast to apply for prediction; they are easy to understand; and they all save analysts time and resources. We show that, on real data, our best performing model (heterogeneous group detection) can attain 99.958% specificity and 99.145% sensitivity, while automatically labeling 99% of alerts within an alert group, translating to a 92.322% reduction in initial labeling workload. To offset the overhead incurred by introducing false positives in this case, it must take ≥ 4354 times as long to further act on a promoted alert, on average, than to perform the initial labeling. Even
